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Abstract:  We analyze development trajectories of early civilizations where population size and 
technology are endogenous, and derive conditions under which such societies optimally “switch” 
from anarchy to hierarchy – when it is optimal to elect and support a ruler.  The ruler provides an 
efficient level of law and order, but creams off part of society’s surplus for his own consumption.  
Switching to hierarchy occurs if the state of technology exceeds a threshold value, but societies 
may also be “trapped” at lower levels of technology – perpetuating conditions of anarchy.  We 
present empirical evidence based on the Standard Cross Cultural Sample that support the model’s 
main predictions. 
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The Origins of Governments: 
From Amorphy to Anarchy and Hierarchy 
 
 
1. Introduction 
A nice political economy literature has evolved that deals with the size distribution of nations, 
focusing on the gains and losses of breaking up or integrating regions (e.g. Bolton et al. 1996, 
Bolton and Roland 1997, Alesina and Spolaore 1997).  Among the key issues that play a role are 
potential efficiency gains in terms of public good provision from creating larger units, versus 
associated heterogeneity costs (in terms of policy preferences) and distributional issues.  One 
relevant application concerns scale economies in the production of military might, so it is not 
surprising that the impact of international conflict on endogenous border formation has been 
studied in some detail (e.g. Alesina and Spolaore 2005, 2006).  One interpretation of this political 
economy literature is that it addresses the question why the whole world is not integrated in a 
single nation (Bolton et al. 1996).  In this paper we consider the polar opposite question –– why do 
we find clustering of a set of homogenous individuals with similar abilities and preferences into 
“hierarchical groups” (or nations) in the first place?  This amounts to an enquiry into the origins 
and evolution of hierarchic structure in societies.  Following Alesina and Spolaore we focus on 
conflict as a guiding theme. 
According to the definitions of Hirshleifer (1995), the world was characterized by phases 
of ‘amorphy’ and ‘anarchy’ prior to the emergence of nation states (‘hierarchy’).  Amorphy refers 
to societies without storage, where resources are consumed on the move.  This is clearly the 
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relevant state of affairs for most of mankind’s history – we have been mobile hunter-gatherers 
living from hand to mouth for millennia, and some societies still are.  Such societies did not need 
(organized) defense to prevent others from stealing belongings.  Other than the territory occupied 
for foraging, there was simply not much to steal.  This situation changed after the agricultural 
transition, some 10,000 years ago for early farming societies (see Weisdorf 2005).  Along with 
several other major changes to the human lifestyle, this involved production of surpluses and 
storage of commodities in a systematic way (e.g., Fernandez-Armesto 2001).  Growing crops is a 
seasonal activity, so that reliance on storage is necessary to survive from one harvest to another.  
Indeed, crops maturing in the field are also, to some degree, stored assets.  While possibly efficient 
in terms of aggregate production, storage also opens the door to theft – enabling a new economic 
sector (one of thieves and raiders) to emerge.  Anarchy, then, refers to a system of spontaneous 
order in which agents can seize and defend resources without regulation from above.  From a 
situation of anarchy societies may evolve towards hierarchy, where defense decisions are made by 
a central authority to incorporate the positive external effects of defense.  This likely happens 
when the gains from such a transition for the people exceed the costs. 
How important is the presence of storage in provoking a transition to hierarchy and greater 
social organization for the purposes of defense? Anthropologists have long recognized that 
capacity for production and storing resources has a profound impact on the social structure of 
society, a transformation that is evident even when comparing hunter-gatherers. Woodburn (1982), 
for example, draws a distinction between simple and complex hunter-gatherers. Complex hunter-
gatherers featured some degree of hierarchy, admitted a degree of inequality among citizens and 
chiefs, and possessed economies that relied heavily on stored resources. They were also more 
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likely to engage in organized warfare, own specific tracts of land, and practice slavery.1 Kelly 
(1995, p. 311), in his synopsis of the differences between simple and complex hunter-gatherers 
puts it succinctly: “… storage carries with it the seeds of conflict.”  Anthropologists have also 
invoked the link between storage and hierarchy at higher levels. In his classic text, Harris (1997, p. 
295) points out that taxation is only possible if there is some degree of storage capacity present in 
the society, and also argues that there are greater possibilities for the development and 
maintenance of hierarchy in the presence of resources that are storable.2 
The transition from amorphy to anarchy and on to hierarchy, triggered by the accumulation 
of wealth (‘lootable assets’), implies an evolutionary trajectory characterized by (i) the absence of 
thieving and raiding, followed by (ii) the rise of thieving and raiding and decentralized defense 
levels, which in turns might give way to (iii) the emergence of hierarchic structure to provide 
efficient levels of law and order.  The corollary is that in times of economic downturns and loss of 
assets, hierarchic societies may regress to anarchy.  Indeed, there is evidence of this, too.  For 
example, Bell (1971) links the rise and fall of Egyptian kingdoms to variations in affluence.  
During years of prosperity, Egyptians were represented by a strong and wealthy kingship that 
upheld a stable society.  But periods of economic misery (e.g. prolonged periods of drought) would 
cause kingships to break down.3  Similar evidence exists for the fall of the Maya civilization and 
Roman Empire, and the plight of the society on Easter Island (see Diamond 2005).  Indeed, even 
up to the time of the Industrial Revolution, shifts between economic prosperity/misery and 
hierarchy/anarchy existed. Between 1560 and 1770, for example, England experienced “numerous 
                                                 
1 The classic example are the hunter-gatherer peoples of the Pacific Northwest of North America. Kelly (1995, p. 302) 
lists a few other societies that fit this mold, including some peoples of California, the Ainu in Japan, and the Calusa of 
Florida.  
2 As an example, Harris (1997, p. 296) describes work in Earle (1989), Hommon (1986) and Kirch (1984) on the 
origins and development of Hawaiian society, arguing that the lack of capacity to produce a storable grain inhibited the 
development of a larger, centralized state on the island chain.  
3 For example, around 2180 BCE the Egyptian Kingdom, known as Dynasty VI, collapsed. During the following so-
called Egyptian Dark Age, which lasted 20-25 years, “hardly any form of civil disorder was absent, ranging from strife 
between districts, to looting and killing … to individual crime run riot, to revolution and social anarchy” (ibid. p. 7). 
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periods of political turmoil, internal warfare, and important changes in political regimes” (Clark 
1996, p. 568). 
This study provides a model that links technological progress to the existence of hierarchic 
structures upholding the rule of law.  Kings or ruling elites (in what follows we use these terms 
interchangeably) can provide such a service and arguably represent the predecessor of nation 
states.  Kings taxed their farmers to finance the provision of law and order, as well as their own 
consumption.  While the political economy literature on the size distribution of nations mentioned 
above typically assumes a government maximizing the benefits of the median voter, we introduce 
a selfish ruler maximizing its own surplus.  The tradeoff for the people, therefore, is not to balance 
efficiency gains (public goods) versus heterogeneity costs, as in most of the existing literature on 
jurisdictional size.  Instead, they choose between being raided by thieves versus being taxed by a 
king.  We analyze the economic incentives for the transition from anarchy to hierarchy against the 
backdrop of population growth and endogenous technical change in production.   
There are two important prior contributions related to our work.4  First, Usher (1989) 
provides a model of so-called dynastic cycles – alternating periods of peace and prosperity on the 
one hand, and chaos and decline on the other.  A ruling elite provides socially optimal levels of 
defense, taking the public good nature of deterrence effort into account, bringing stability and 
setting the stage for populations to grow.  However, diminishing returns to labor will eventually 
lower incomes (and taxable surplus), eventually undermining the incentive for a ruler to provide 
public goods.  The result is a fall back into chaos and a decline in human population density, which 
in turn raises incomes.  Eventually, sufficient taxable surplus warrants the re-entry of a new king.  
An important difference between Usher (1989) and our work is that the transition from hierarchy 
                                                 
4 In addition to these two contributions, our paper is also somewhat related to earlier work on the origins of firms.  For 
example, Alchian and Demsetz (1972) argue that putting in place a ”central common party to a set of bilateral 
contracts” facilitates efficient organization of the joint inputs, which is remeniscent of our story.  
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to anarchy is the result of a choice by the ruler in Usher, whereas we assume the people make such 
choices.   
Second, and closest to our work, Grossman (2002) considers the question whether 
producers are better off with centralized defenses organized by a ruler or with decentralized 
defense in a situation of anarchy.  We extend Grossman’s approach along three dimensions.  First, 
we employ a conventional conflict, or contest, function to describe the interaction between 
producers and raiders, and hence the benefits from a switching towards hierarchy.  Second, we 
develop a dynamic model where population size and the level of technology evolve endogenously 
so that we can analyze the evolution of anarchy to hierarchy.   Unlike Grossman, our model 
suggests the existence of multiple stable equilibria, underdevelopment traps in anarchy, and so on.  
Third, we explore some of the model’s implications using an existing dataset on lifestyle and 
material culture of indigenous peoples at various stages of development (the Standard Cross-
Cultural Sample, or SCCS dataset). Among other things, this data includes information on the 
technological sophistication and governance structure of a varied group of peoples, both past and 
present.  
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we present the static model. We start off by 
introducing the anarchic case of a society without a ruler, and then analyze the consequences of 
introducing a selfish king.  We compare payoffs for producers, and determine the conditions under 
which a king would be voted into office.  In Section 3 we introduce population growth and 
technological change and consider the dynamics of institutional development in more detail.  We 
interpret our specification of technical change as the gradual transition from foraging to early 
agriculture, and the accompanying emergence of stored (and hence ‘lootable’) commodities.  In 
section 4 we present and discuss the main results, which we then put to some empirical testing in 
Section 5.  Finally, section 6 concludes. 
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2. The Static Model  
2.1 The case of anarchy 
Consider a society or group of n members, some of which earn a living as a producer (or early 
farmer) and others are supporting themselves by raiding producers, taking part of their output.  
People are risk neutral and amoral, preferring to become thieves whenever that profession is more 
profitable than producing.  The total population is described as follows: 
(1) n = nf + nr, 
where nf denotes the number of producers, and nr denotes the number of raiders in society.  Each 
raider devotes his entire endowment of time (one unit) to raiding.  In contrast, producers split their 
time between production and defense effort to protect their output from raiders.  The time 
constraint for producers is given by 1=+ dl  where l  is labor devoted to production and d is 
defense effort by the producer.   
There are two inputs in production, land and labor, and that the production function is 
given by μβ lAqlqf =),( , where β, μ ≤ 1.  Land is available in fixed supply, and we normalize the 
total land base to unity.  After career choices, each producer is allotted an equal share of available 
land upon which to produce, so each producer receives (1/nf) units of land.  To simplify the 
analysis and exposition, and without affecting the qualitative results, we set μ=1 in what follows so 
that the production function for any producer, net of any theft of output, is given by:  
(2) lsAn ff
β−=π , 
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where A  is a parameter measuring the state of technology (which will be made endogenous 
below) and s  is the share of output retained by the producer.    We specify the contest or share 
function as follows:5  
(3) 
f
r
n
nd
ds
θ+
= , 
where the parameter θ  is a proxy for (lack of) security and measures the ease with which output 
can be stolen.  This parameter must take on values less than one-half, as will become evident 
below.  This share function is consistent with the idea that all raiders devote all of their efforts to 
theft, and each farmer bears an equal fraction of total raiding effort.  Using the time constraint and 
the share function, producers’ payoffs are defined as: 
(4) θψ+
−=π β d
d
n
dA
f
f
)1( , 
where Ψ = nr/nf, or the ratio of raiders to producers in the economy.  Under autarky, each producer 
chooses defense efforts to maximize (4) while taking the number of raiders in the population as 
given.  The optimal choice of defense is simply:  
(5) ( ) θψ−θψ+θψ= 2Ad . 
Plugging (5) into (4) gives the following expression for the optimal return to producing and 
defending for any combination of raiding and producing, nr and nf, in the economy:  
(6) 
( ) ( )
( ) θψθψ
θψθψθψθψθψθψ
π
+
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +−+
=
2
221
Af . 
                                                 
5 Note there is a subtle difference in Grossman’s method and the one used here. Grossman assumes the share of 
resources retained depends upon the fraction of effort devoted to defense, so s = 1 when d = 1, regardless of the 
proportion of raiders to defenders. Our specification is arguably more natural, and is certainly more commonly used in 
the literature. A more general specification would raise contest effort of raiders and farmers to a certain power R.  
Baye et al. (1994) demonstrate that a symmetric Nash equilibrium then exists, even for R>2. 
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Next, consider the payoffs for raiders.  Assuming each raider gets an equal share of the total ’take’, 
these payoffs consist of the total resources stolen from producers divided by the number of raiders:  
(7) ψ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
θψ+−
−=π β
11)1(
d
d
n
dA
f
r .  
Using the equilibrium value of defense in (5), we have:   
(8) 
( )
( ) θψθψ
θψθψθψθπ
β +
+−+=
2
21
f
r
n
A .  
In equilibrium, people are indifferent between producing and raiding so that the returns from each 
career choice should be the same.  Equating (6) and (8) results in the following expression for the 
ratio of raiders to producers in the economy (or the raid ratio): 
(9) θ−
θ=ψ≡
21f
r
n
n .  
Hence, the fraction of raiders in the population only depends on security parameter θ .  Amorphy, 
as defined by Hirschleifer, thus occurs in the special case where θ =0.  As θ  increases, so does the 
relative number of raiders.  When θ =½, all agents prefer to be raiders and per capita income in the 
economy has completely evaporated.  In equilibrium, we have the following number of producers:  
(10) θ
θ
−
−=
1
)21(nn f . 
The returns to productive labor are given by: 
(11) )21( θππ β −== −frf An .     
Upon substituting (10) in (11) we get an expression for equilibrium income of raiders and farmers: 
(12) ββ−β−
β−β− θ−θ−=θ−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
θ−
θ−=π=π )1()21()21(
1
21 1AnAnAr
A
f .  
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Note that the returns in (12) depend upon the degree of security present in society, and in particular 
go to zero as θ goes to ½. We now investigate how these outcomes are affected when a potential 
king enters the scene. 
2.2. The case of hierarchy 
Following Grossman (2002), under hierarchy, the ruler organizes defense on behalf of everybody 
in society.  While individual people still use their own effort to protect their output, the ruler 
decides on the allocation of time between production and defense.6  The key difference with 
anarchy is that the king takes into account that the number of raiders is endogenous with respect to 
the level of defense.  In other words, the ruler internalizes the external effect that raising defense 
induces some raiders to become producers instead, as opposed to the decision of individual agents 
that just balances foregone production versus the share of output that can be retained.  However, 
the king also reserves the right to collect taxes, and the cost of hierarchy is that the hierarch is 
concerned about his own welfare when setting taxes.  The payoffs to being a producer are now 
defined as:  
(13) θψ+
−τ−=π β
H
H
f
H
f d
d
n
dA )1()1( , 
where Hd  denotes the centralized level of defense and τ is the tax rate chosen by the hierarch.  
Assuming only legitimate activities are subject to taxation, the returns to being a raider are now 
given by:  
(14) 11)1( −β ψ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
θψ+−
−=π
H
H
f
H
r d
d
n
dA . 
                                                 
6 In what follows we ignore problems of free riding and cheating, and simply assume that the ruler is able to force ”his 
people” to the optimal allocation of time.  For an early discussion of this simplification, refer to Williamson (1973). 
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The hierarch must set the level of defense and tax rate so that the following condition is satisfied: 
(15) 11)1()1()1( −ββ ψ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
θψ+−
−≥θψ+
−τ−
H
H
f
H
H
H
f
H
d
d
n
dA
d
d
n
dA ,  
otherwise, he collects no tax revenues.  Equation (15) reduces to the following condition:  
(16) θτ ≥− Hd)1( . 
The total tax revenues collected by the hierarch are then defined by βτ−= fHH nAdny /)1( . The 
hierarch chooses defense to maximize tax revenues subject to a “participation constraint” (16), or 
the condition that people prefer to produce rather than to raid.  Note this choice involves an 
elementary tradeoff.  While the government wishes to raise the tax rate, he is restricted in his 
ability to do so by the fact that raising taxes implies he should simultaneously mandate higher 
levels of defense (which comes at the expense of foregone production).  The reason is that raising 
the tax rate makes a ”switch” to raiding more attractive, ceteris paribus, which must be offset by 
an increase in defenses.  The solution to the hierarch’s problem is:  
(17) θ=Hd .  
Not surprisingly, centralized defense levels are higher than the anarchic level of defenses, 
reflecting that the king considers the impact of defense decisions on career choice while individual 
producers do not.7  Plugging in the optimal value of τ  and Hd  into (11) gives the following 
expression for producers’ income under a ruler:  
(18)  βθθπ −−= AnHf )1( .      
We can now solve for the critical security level where people are indifferent between being raided 
and taxed by equating (12) and (18).  The critical parameter is defined by the following condition:  
                                                 
7 Note that (15) defines a new constraint on parameter θ: since the time constraint implies d ≤ 1, interior solutions can 
only occur for θ < 1 as well.  Since this “hierarchy constraint” is less stringent than the anarchy constraint, θ < ½, it 
will be satisfied automatically. 
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(19) ββ θθθθ )1()21()1( 1 −−>− − .     
Since the right-hand-side, RHS, of (21) monotonically decreases in the magnitude of θ  for any 
value less than ½ and the left-hand-side increases and then decreases, there exists a unique 
intersection point.  Denote this threshold value as θ*.  For sufficiently large values of θ  we find 
that Af
H
f ππ > .   
While this model is suited for discussing the tradeoff between autarky and an appropriative 
government, it says nothing about how the degree of government is influenced by population and 
technological progress, or about the different possible phases in the development process of 
societies over time.  A dynamic model is necessary to consider these issues. 
 
3. A Dynamic Model 
We now introduce equations of motion to capture the intertemporal development of population 
size and the state of technology.  Following Galor (2005) and others, we assume that technical 
progress is one of the main drivers of the model, and aim to capture the process of innovation and 
depreciation (erosion) of the state of technology as follows:  
(20) AAnA f δ−υ= γα& , 
where dtdAA /=& .  The first term on the RHS captures innovations and the second term captures 
erosion of technology (δ denotes a depreciation parameter).  The specification in (20) assumes the 
state of technology is increasing in the current state of technology, A, and in the population of 
producers which may be due to some ’innovation by doing’ argument, or because higher 
population density allows for a faster exchange of ideas, etc. (e.g. Shekhar et al., 2006).  Although 
this is not important for the model that follows, we envisage the gradual increase in A over time as 
the gradual transition from foraging to early farming.   
 13
One implication of 0>A&  is that output becomes easier to steal – increases in output 
(surpluses) not only imply that guarding output becomes harder, theft may also be facilitated due 
to changes in the nature of production.  For example, if producers rely more on harvesting produce 
that they have planted or sown themselves, then raiders may have relatively easy access to the 
stock when it is on the field.  This means it is realistic to assume that the security parameter θ is 
not invariant with respect to technology levels.  We capture this idea by assuming a linear relation 
between the state of technology and the ease with which output can be stolen (the results are robust 
with respect to alternative monotonic relationships):  
(21) θ ≡ zA,  
where z is just a scaling parameter.  In line with the earlier discussions on threshold values for the 
security parameter θ , specification (21) defines an upper limit on productivity for the anarchy and 
hierarchy models to be sensible – respectively zAA 2/1=<  and zAA /1~ =< .  Failing to satisfy 
these conditions implies all become raiders (for the anarchy model) or producers allocate all their 
time to defenses and there is no production (for the hierarchy model).  
Recall people are indifferent between anarchy and hierarchy when θ = θ* (or A = A*).  For 
θ > θ* (or A > A*) the dynamics of the state of technology are determined in the context of a 
society governed by a ruler.  Instead, for θ < θ* (or A < A*), anarchy prevails and some people 
prefer to raid rather than produce.  This means we must derive two different segments of the 0=A&  
isocline associated with (20), or two distinct segments where technology is constant.  One segment 
is relevant for the anarchy context (where some people are raiding, Ψ>0, and not contributing to 
the accumulation of knowledge) and another one is relevant for the hierarchy context (Ψ=0).  
Solving for 0=A&  under anarchy and hierarchy results in, respectively:   
(22a) 
αγ− ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
υ
δ
−
−=
/1
1
21
1 A
zA
zAn , and   
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 (22b) 
αγ− ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
υ
δ=
/1
1An . 
Equations (22a) and (22b) imply that, at A=A*, there is a discontinuity in the 0=A&  isocline, 
which jumps downwards then (note 0 < (1-zA)/(1-2zA) < 1). 
Specification of a population growth process completes the system’s dynamics.  Following 
a large literature on early economic civilizations (e.g. Brander and Taylor 1998, Horan et al. 2005) 
we describe population dynamics by a simple Malthusian process: 
(23) ,1 ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ π+−ϕ=
S
n
dt
dn i  
where ϕ is a population growth parameter, i denotes anarchy or hierarchy, and S is a food intake 
threshold (minimum caloric intake for self-maintenance).  For π < S, the population shrinks and for 
π > S it grows.  Condition (23) is readily solved for the 0=n&  isocline by setting π = S and, again, 
there are 2 distinct isocline segments depending on whether A is greater or smaller than A*.  The 
isocline segments for anarchy and hierarchy, respectively, are given by: 
(24a) 
βββ−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−=
/11 )1()21(
S
zAzAAn , and  
(24b) 
β
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −=
/1
)1(
S
zAzAAn .   
With these building blocks in place, we can now turn to an analysis of the dynamics of population 
growth and technical change, and the consequences for institutional change.  
 
4. Model results 
Before we analyze the dynamics and steady states in some detail, it is instructive to consider the 
impact of technical change on some of the model’s key variables in equilibrium.  In Figure 1 we 
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demonstrate that the anarchic raid ratio (ψ), or the number of raiders divided by their victims, 
increases as the state of technology increases.  While an increase in productivity increases the 
returns to both producing and raiding (so that the net effect is neutral)8, there is an additional effect 
due to the assumption that the production and storage of surpluses enhances the ease with which 
output can be stolen – tipping the balance in favor of becoming a raider.  The net effect of 
technical change on income of producers and raiders is ambiguous, depending on the level of 
technical change (see Figure 3 below).  Technical change raises the value marginal product of 
labor allocated to production, but since fewer people actually produce the net effect on income is 
unclear.  Specifically, if we consider the case where society is in anarchy before and after the 
increase in A (so that equation (12) describes income throughout), we can use (21) to show that 
technical change is detrimental for income if: 
(25)    041 <−=π zA
dA
d , 
which is the case whenever A > 1/4z, or when the raid ratio curve is sufficiently steep (see Figures 
1 and 3). 
   < Figure 1 about here > 
Next, consider the case of hierarchy.  In Figure 2 we show that an increase in the state of 
technology lowers the equilibrium tax rate.  Since technical progress makes raiding more 
attractive, the ruler aims to neutralize the incentive to switch from producing to raiding, and 
lowering the tax rate so that producers can retain a larger share of their output is one approach to 
doing this.  An alternative approach to restoring the balance between producing and raiding would 
be to raise the levels of defense, but this comes at the cost of foregone production.  To find the 
optimal tax rate, the ruler balances the foregone profit share from low taxes versus the foregone 
output from raising defense levels.  Hence, while technical advances ambiguously impact on 
                                                 
8 Note that the argument A does not appear in (9) – the raid ratio is only a function of security parameter θ. 
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producers’ income under conditions of anarchy, when ruled by a king it makes producers 
unambiguously better off – it allows them to retain a greater share of a larger pie.  One may use 
(18) to verify that 0/ >π dAd H .     
< Figure 2 about here > 
In Figure 3 we provide equilibrium income for anarchic and hierarchical societies.  As 
explained above, the relation between the state of technology and income under anarchy is non-
monotonous.  The critical level of technology A*, and the associated critical security parameter θ*, 
is defined by the unique interior intersection of the two income curves. 
< Figure 3 about here > 
4.1 Analysis of the dynamic system 
The analysis until now implies that simple models with exogenous technical change (i.e., 
teAA σ= 0&  where σ is a parameter) will necessarily undergo the transition from anarchy to 
hierarchy: eventually the level of technology will be sufficiently high to elect a king in power.  Is 
this also true for our dynamic model with endogenous technical change?  The answer is no.  For 
different parameter combinations we obtain qualitatively different results.  In what follows we 
illustrate this important point by presenting two interesting cases.   
In Figure 4 we provide the phase plane for one possible configuration of parameters, 
providing the isoclines as derived in (22) and (24).9  On the horizontal axis the state of technology 
is depicted, and the vertical axis provides population numbers (or density).  As before, A* denotes 
the critical technology level, so that for A < A* the anarchy segments (22a, 24a) are relevant, and 
for A > A* the hierarchy segments (22b, 24b).  The present configuration has two potentially stable 
interior steady states: in both the anarchy and hierarchy sectors of the phase plane the 
0=A& isocline cuts the 0=n& isocline from below, which implies that each steady state is a 
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focus or node.  The stability of the steady states depends on the relative slopes of the isoclines, and 
may be analyzed further by examining the eigenvalues of the linearized system in equilibrium.   
< Figure 4 about here > 
The existence of a potentially stable steady state in the anarchy sector implies that societies 
may “get stuck” to the left of A* and never elect a king.  These low-tech societies prefer to go 
untaxed and provide defense on a decentralized basis.  We interpret these societies with low 
productivity levels and little or no storage of commodities as stable foragers’ societies.  Other 
societies, however, will cross the security (or productivity) threshold – possibly because the 
trajectories cycle outward.  Depending on the trajectory, such societies will eventually support a 
king providing efficient levels of security, or cycle back towards the anarchic segment.  Indeed, as 
in Usher (1989) it may be feasible to have ‘dynastic cycles’ where societies grow and collapse and 
undergo periodic phases of anarchy.10  The model predicts farmers’ societies where storable and 
‘lootable’ surpluses are produced will settle down in the hierarchic steady state.  This is a 
prediction that is amenable to empirical testing in section 5.11 
The phase plane suggests that societies are more likely to become hierarchical if the initial 
level of technology is ‘high’ (i.e. close to the threshold) or if the population is ‘large.’12  In 
contrast, societies with few people are likely to evolve towards anarchy, even if their initial level 
of technology places them to the right of the threshold.  The reason is that such societies will 
gradually lose their level of technical sophistication as new innovations fail to keep pace with the 
erosion of knowledge (similar to the findings in Shekhar et al., 2006).  As an interesting aside, 
                                                                                                                                                                
9 To be precise, Figure 4 is based on z=1, α=0.3, β=0.3, δ=0.9, γ=0.2, ν=1.0 and S=0.205. 
10 But unlike the model of Usher, the dynamics are not governed by diminishing returns in production and a king that 
voluntarily steps down – it is driven by cycles of population abundance that affect productivity levels and the ease with 
which output can be stolen (affecting the incentives of the people to support a king, or not). 
11 An additional effect, not captured by the model, is that agriculture and storage facilitate financing a hierarch as it 
makes it much easier to collect taxes: agricultural output is readily observable, and storage enables accumulatation of 
resources to pay for taxes. 
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while population size is important during the transition phase, the model predicts that equilibrium 
population size of the anarchy and hierarchy steady state cannot be unambiguously ranked.  
Indeed, for the combination of parameters underlying Figure 4 we find that the hierarchical society 
is smaller than the anarchic one.  Again, this is a model implication that may be amenable to 
empirical testing. 
In Figure 5 we present an alternative phase plane based on a different set of parameters.13  
This is the case where the 0=A& isocline cuts the 0=n& isocline from below in the anarchy 
sector (as before), and from above in the hierarchy sector of the phase plane.  The anarchy steady 
state is again a focus or node, but the hierarchic steady state is now a saddle point.  The separatrix 
associated with the saddle point divides the hierarchy sector in two parts – below the separatrix the 
system is pushed (back) towards anarchy, above if the system is pushed on a path of sustained 
growth where population increases and technical mutually increase each other.  In other words, an 
anarchic society that faces a sufficiently large (temporary) productivity shock – say, a climatic 
shock or significant technical innovation (possibly through technology import) – will face a 
fundamentally different future.  This will happen if due to the shock the system “jumps” above the 
separatrix.  Not only will it elect a king in power, it will also experience sustained growth where 
population growth spurs technical change, and where the income increase following technical 
change permits Malthusian style population growth.  
< Figure 5 about here >   
This is not intended as an exhaustive analysis of all potential dynamic outcomes.  For 
example, some parameter values imply the anarchic steady state disappears (i.e., the isoclines do 
not intersect for values of A below A*) and others imply it changes into a saddle point.  The latter 
                                                                                                                                                                
12 The intuition for the latter is evident: if societies start sufficiently ”high” in the phase plane, they will necessarily 
cross the A = A* threshold.  The reason is that technical change occurs at a rapid rate in societies with many people.  
Even if the population ”shrinks”, the level is high enough to induce a transition from foraging to early agriculture.  
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possibility suggests that for some initial conditions (specifically: for starting points below the 
anarchy separatrix) society will become trapped in a vicious circle of population decline and 
technical regression, and eventually go extinct.  For other initial conditions, of course, the 
transition to hierarchy is inevitable.  Detailed knowledge about underlying parameters of societies 
is necessary to predict the qualitative nature of its long-term fate. 
 
5. Empirical analysis 
In this section, we describe some of empirical evidence that supports the idea that there is 
strong relationship between the degree of hierarchy and the technological sophistication of a 
society. Our approach is to study the incidence of hierarchy across a cross-section of different 
cultures. 
We employ the Standard Cross Cultural Sample (henceforth SCCS), an extensive and well-
documented cross-cultural data set originally developed in the work of Murdock and White 
(1969).14 The SCCS contains information on the technology, environment, and culture of 186 
indigenous cultures. As separate data points, it includes sub-Saharan African hunter gatherers, 
Native American hunter-gatherers, European peoples, large-scale agricultural nation-state cultures 
of Meso-America (such as the Aztecs), and historical nation-state peoples (such as the ancient 
Hebrews and Egyptians), among others. The geographical distribution of the societies in the SCCS 
is displayed on Map 1, which we shall discuss in more detail momentarily. The majority of the 
cultures in the SCCS were sampled at a time coinciding with or just after contact with western 
cultures (the mean date of contact among the cultures is 1850, but some observations – for 
                                                                                                                                                                
13 Figure 5 is based on z=1, α=0.135, β=0.3, δ=0.9, γ=0.9, ν=1.0 and S=0.15. 
14 For more detailed descriptions of the data and its use in economics, see Baker (2005), Baker and Miceli (2004), and 
Pryor (1985). The dataset has expanded to include approximately 2000 variables, and is currently maintained by 
William Divale, who distributes updated versions of the SCCS in the journal World Cultures. We have also indicated 
the original source of the data where possible.    
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example, the ancient Egyptians – date from considerably earlier). These cultures can be taken as a 
reasonably representative of the cultural and technological diversity of human history.15  
< Map 1 about here >   
The SCCS has a variety of variables that broadly capture the notion of hierarchy that we 
develop in the theoretical section of the paper. However, available variables vary greatly in their 
quality and completeness, and for this reason we settled on a variable referred to as “Jurisdictional 
Hierarchy beyond the Local Community,” which we will henceforth refer to as the degree of 
hierarchy.16  This variable runs on a scale from 1 to 5 for each society. A society earns a score of 1 
in this scale variable if higher political authority is absent, a score of 2 if petty chiefs are present; a 
society earns a score of 3 on the scale if it is a larger chiefdom. The scores 4 and 5 on the scale are 
reserved for state forms of government, where a society earns a 5 if the governance structure is that 
of a state with multiple jurisdictions.  
Since our theoretical model is basically dichotomous in nature, predicting either the 
presence or absence of hierarchy, we will also transform the degree of hierarchy variable into a 
dichotomous variable where a society earns a 0 if there is no higher political authority (i.e., a score 
of 1 on the degree of hierarchy scale), and a 1 for all other values on the scale.  This extra analysis 
serves as a robustness check for other results. 
There are other variables that might proxy for the degree of hierarchy in the SCCS, but 
choices among these variables do not make a big difference in the analysis. For example, Tuden 
and Marshall’s (1972) four-point scale rating the levels of sovereignty present in each society is 
also in the SCCS, as is their five point scale variable measuring the presence and nature of policy 
                                                 
15 The mean contact year for societies in the SCCS is 1853. However, it must be said that there is great variance in the 
amount of contact the societies in the SCCS have had with the modern western world, and the SCCS does not include 
any information about the degree to which societies have had contact with other centers of development, such as the 
Far East. We develop several proxies for the degree of contact with the west. 
16 This variable was originally coded by George Murdock (1967) in the Ethnographic Atlas, which is a larger but less 
complete cross cultural data set. 
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forces in the society. Perhaps not surprisingly, the variable upon which we rely has a correlation 
coefficient (significant at well above the 99% level) with these two alternative measures of 0.77 
and 0.68, respectively.  
Our theoretical model postulates a positive relationship between hierarchy and 
technological sophistication, and there are several measures that might be worthwhile to use in this 
regard. We employ a set of variables in the SCCS to measure technological sophistication, 
including the degree to which writing and record-keeping are present in a society, a measure of 
task specialization, a measure of storage and surplus abilities of the society, and the contribution of 
agriculture to the food supply.17 These variables, along with some other variables (which serve as 
instruments in some of our regressions), are described in Table 1.  For transparency, we also 
present summary statistics for all variables, sorted by the presence or absence of hierarchy, in 
Table 2. 
< Tables 1 and 2 about here >    
To get a better feel for the relationship between hierarchy and technology, and in light of 
the fact that the technological variables plainly increase together, we have also constructed a 
univariate index of technology using principal components. Specifically, we assemble an index of 
technological sophistication for each society using the first principal component constructed with 
these four variables. The first component captures a strongly positive association between the four 
variables and explains nearly 50 percent of the joint variation in the four variables.18 We take this 
to mean that in one strong dimension the overall level of technology in the society is increasing. 
These components to construct a weighted average of the variables and a univariate measure of 
                                                 
17 The specialization scale variable, the reliance on agriculture scale variable, and the writing and record keeping 
variable were all coded originally be George Murdock.  
18 To be specific, the technology index is computed using the first principal component as follows: technology=.5915 
specialization + .4902 agriculture + .4995 writing + .4005 storage. This component explains 49.66% of the joint 
variation in these variables. As one would expect, all the coefficients are positive, meaning that the four indices all 
vary strongly in one direction. Somewhat surprisingly, the four scale variables enter into the first principal component 
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technological sophistication. We shall refer to this index as “the level of technology,” or more 
succinctly, “technology.”  The resulting technology index has a mean of zero, a minimum value of 
-2.54, and a maximum value of 2.72. A society for which the technology value is close to the 
lower limit can be thought of as one with little storage capacity, a low reliance on agriculture, little 
or no record keeping and writing, and little task specialization.  
As a first look at the data, consider Map 1. On the map, those societies that can be 
considered hierarchical (using our dummy variable) are marked with squares, and those that are 
not hierarchical are marked with circles. Inside each square or circle, we have included some 
information on the technology index. A zero indicates that our principal components index of 
technology is less than -2, a one indicates the index falls between -2 and -0.5, a two indicates the 
index falls between -0.5 and 0.5, a three indicates the index falls between 0.5 and 2, and a four 
indicates a value for the technological index greater than 2.  
From Map 1 one may glean the insight that there appears to be some relationship between 
technological sophistication and the degree of hierarchy. While there are some societies that are 
hierarchical that are not that advanced, and vice versa, the trend is certainly positive.19  This is 
confirmed by the results in Table 3, in which we present means of the technology variables and 
population density (again on a five-point scale) for each level of jurisdictional hierarchy. For 
virtually every piece of data in the dataset there appears to be a strong relationship between 
technology, population density, and the degree of hierarchy.  An early conclusion from casual 
inspection of the data is therefore that technological sophistication appears to be strongly related to 
hierarchy and population density. 
                                                                                                                                                                
with very similar weights, suggesting that a simple sum of these variables might not be a bad index of technological 
sophistication.  
19 Moreover, the more technologically advanced societies appear to be nearer initial centers of civilization and are also 
more hierarchical. 
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To analyze these relationships further we have done a series of multivariate regressions. 
We treat the level of hierarchy as the dependent variable, and use population density and the state 
of technology as explanatory variables. Since technology and population density may be 
endogenous, and because the analysis may suffer from omitted variables and measurement error, 
we report both OLS results and IV results.  As instruments for population and technology we use a 
series of environmental and geographical variables presented in Tables 1 and 2, which describes 
the source of each variable and a description of the content of each variable. These variables are 
truly exogenous, and unlikely to be directly related to the nature of hierarchical structures, and 
therefore are proper instruments for this purpose. The intuition behind the choice of instruments is 
twofold. First, variables measuring the characteristics of the environment are likely to be sources 
of exogenous variability in the productivity of land, and therefore should exert some impact on  
population density. Second, variables measuring the distance of the society from centers of 
civilization should influence the degree to which the society receives technological sources 
independently of its internal endogenous growth, idea-generating dynamic. The OLS results and 
the 2nd stage results of the IV analysis are reported in Table 4.  We report results for models where 
the degree of hierarchy is the dependent variable (i.e. using the 5 point scale of the SCCS) and 
where hierarchy is treated as a binary variable.  
The results support the model.  First, we consistently find a significant and robust positive 
relation between hierarchy and technological sophistication, regardless of how we measure the 
latter variable.  The separate technology variables as well as our technology index tend to be 
positively associated with the level of hierarchical structure.  Our preferred specifications are the 
ones where we instrument for technology levels (columns 2 and 3).  Column 5 suggests storage 
might play an important role – the size of its coefficient is significantly larger than the coefficients 
of the other technology variables.  
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Second, the regression analyses suggest there is no clear link between population density 
and the level of hierarchy. In particular, when we use instruments to control for possible 
endogeneity there appears no direct causal link from population density to hierarchical structures.  
This is remarkable in view of the earlier literature highlighting the importance of the efficiency 
gains associated with providing public goods to larger groups of people. Our model and results 
lends support to the idea that population influences the incidence of hierarchy only because it is 
likely to increase the technological sophistication of a society. Again, this result is consistent with 
the theoretical model – we found that population density may both go up and down following the 
transition from anarchy to hierarchy.   
 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
Why do some societies evolve from anarchy to hierarchy, and why do other societies fail to make 
that transition?  We propose a novel explanation by focusing on internal conflict (raiding) and the 
tradeoffs between decentralized and centralized levels of defense.  While centralized levels of 
defense are efficient – taking external effects into account – and increase total output relative to 
anarchic equilibrium levels, there is an associated cost for producers as the ruling elite is capable to 
tax away part of the surplus for its own consumption.  The main result of the paper is that 
producers prefer to be taxed, rather than be raided, if production technology is sufficiently 
advanced.  Using a dynamic model with endogenous population and technology we demonstrate 
that the evolution from anarchy to hierarchy is possible, but not inevitable – some (foraging) 
societies will prefer to stay egalitarian and anarchic.   
Our empirical analysis, based on the Standard Cross Cultural Sample, supports the model’s 
main predictions.  Using OLS and IV estimation techniques we find that technology levels are an 
important driver of the degree of hierarchy in indigenous cultures, and that ‘storage’ plays a 
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particularly important role in this respect.  The latter result makes perfect sense in the context of 
our model because, in line with several anthropologists, we argue that the ability to store output is 
one of the main determinants of raiding and conflict (enhancing the appeal of efficient levels of 
defense).  Consistent with the theory model, our empirical work also downplays the role of 
population size as a determining factor in the emergence of hierarchic structures.  The potential 
efficiency gains from centralized public good provision are therefore not necessarily an overriding 
concern for community members when deciding about whether to elect a king, or not. 
The theoretical model is very stylized and ignores many salient features of reality.  For 
example, we don’t consider that some communities may be able to coordinate on optimal levels of 
defenses in the absence of a ruler, or that security parameter θ may be subject to technical change 
(related to technical advances in production, or otherwise).  We also ignore the issue of external 
conflict – including fights over territories of different communities – which may clearly provide an 
important impetus for centralized organization of defense (see Baker 2003).  Finally, by assuming 
all community members have identical skills we assume away that there may be internal conflict 
over whether to switch from anarchy to hierarchy, or not.  Members that are more productive than 
others, or have access to more productive land, will prefer to make the transition at some lower 
critical value of technology.  This could result in societies “breaking up” or in some faction 
imposing its will on another.  Analyzing these issues, and others, is left for future work. 
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RAID RATIO AND TECHNOLOGY  
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FIGURE 3 
PAY-OFFS AND TECHNOLOGY  
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FIGURE 4 
POPULATION AND TECHNOLOGY DYNAMICS  
(TWO POTENTIALLY STABLE STEADY STATES) 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5 
POPULATION AND TECHNOLOGY DYNAMICS  
(ONE POTENTIALLY STABLE STEADY STATE, ONE SADDLE-PATH STABLE) 
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MAP 1: THE GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF TECHNOLOGY AND HIERARCHY IN THE SCCS
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TABLE 1: DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES AND SOURCES USED IN THE ANALYSIS 
 Description Source 
Technology and 
population  
  
Jurisdictional 
Hierarchy 
=1 if none, =2 if petty chiefdoms, =3 if larger chiefdoms, =4 if 
states, =5 if there are multi-layered states 
SCCS 
Contribution of 
Agriculture to food 
supply 
=1 if none, =2 if only non-food crops, =3 if <10%,  
=4 if <50% single source, =5 if > 50% single source,  
=6 if primarily agricultural. 
SCCS 
Storage Surplus =1 none or barely adequate, =2 simple storage or adequate, =3 
if complex or more than adequate 
SCCS 
Technological 
specialization 
=0 if no specialization present, =1 if pottery only,  
=2 if loom weaving only, =3 if metalwork only,  
=4 if smiths, weavers, and potters 
SCCS 
Writing and 
Record-Keeping 
=0 none, =1 Mnemonic devices, =2 Non-written records, =3 
True writing, no records, =4 True writing, records  
SCCS 
Population Density =1 if < 1 persons per square mile, =2 1-5 persons per square 
mile, =3 if 5-25 persons per square mile, =4 if 25-100 persons 
per square mile, =5 100 persons per square mile 
SCCS 
Technology index 1st Principal component of Surplus, Specialization, Writing, 
and Agricultural Contribution  
 
 
 Instrumental Variables  
Environmental 
Characteristics 
  
Mean Rainfall Mean yearly rainfall (cm) SCCS, from Cashdan (2003) 
High Rainfall? =1 if mean yearly rainfall is more than 1 standard deviation 
above SCCS mean yearly rainfall 
 
CV Rainfall Coefficient of variation in mean yearly rainfall SCCS, from Cashdan (2003) 
Climate suitability 
for agriculture  
Scale ranging from 0 (impossible) to 4 (very good) developed 
by Pryor using FAO/UNESCO reports 
SCCS, from Pryor (1986) 
Soil suitability for 
agriculture 
Scale ranging from 0 (impossible) to 4 (very good) developed 
by Pryor using FAO/UNESCO  
SCCS, from Pryor (1986) 
Land slope Scale ranging from 2 to 4, 2=steep, 4=relatively flat SCCS, from Pryor (1986) 
No. habitats w/in 
200 miles 
Based on counting the number of vegetation types, ocean and 
lake presence within 200 mile diameter 
SCCS, from Cashdan (2003) 
Ocean w/in 200 mi? =1 if the society is within 200 miles of an ocean SCCS, from Cashdan (2003) 
Number of frost 
months per year 
Number of frost months per year  SCCS    
Primary Production Cubic meters of plant production per year, calculated using 
Kelly (1995) and UNESCO data (1976).  
Baker (2005) 
Geography/Time   
Distance from fertile 
crescent 
Calculated using society coordinates in SCCS, with the fertile 
crescent at 45E, 35N (.786, .611 in radians) 
Baker (2005) 
Closer to another 
hearth?  
=1 if closest to another original hearth of agriculture 
(Northeastern U. S., Central America, South China) 
Baker (2005) 
Distance from 
closest hearth 
Calculated using society coordinates in SCCS, with the 
Northeastern U. S., Central America, and South China as other 
hearths. 
Baker (2005) 
“Vertical” distance 
from fertile crescent 
Calculated to be miles north or south from fertile crescent.  Baker (2005) 
“Vertical” distance 
from closest hearth 
Miles north or south from nearest hearth of 
agriculture/civilization. 
Baker (2005) 
Date of Contact Date for which the reported information pertains SCCS 
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TABLE 2: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF ALL VARIABLES, BY PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF HIERARCHY  
 
Variable All Societies 
N=186 
Hierarchical Societies  
N=102 
Non-Hierarchical Ssocieties 
N=82 
Population Density 
Scale 
2.86 
(1.56) 
3.48*** 
(1.36) 
2.04*** 
(1.39) 
Technology Index 
 
0 
(1.41) 
0.66*** 
(1.29) 
-0.85*** 
(1.06) 
Contribution of 
Agriculture 
3.45 
(1.51) 
3.97*** 
(1.21) 
2.77*** 
(1.58) 
Technological 
Specialization 
3.09 
(1.41) 
3.65*** 
(1.32) 
2.38*** 
(1.21) 
Storage Surplus 
 
1.81 
(0.72) 
1.92** 
(0.70) 
1.67** 
(0.72) 
Writing and Record 
Keeping 
2.35 
(1.47) 
2.89*** 
(1.62) 
1.65*** 
(0.85) 
Instrumental Variables 
Mean rainfall (cm/year) 140.74 
(106.00) 
136.72 
(99.88) 
147.84 
(113.92) 
High Rainfall? 0.17 
(0.37) 
0.14 
(0.35) 
0.21 
(0.41) 
100*(Rainfall CV) 
 
23.53 
(17.88) 
24.23 
(19.44) 
22.66 
(16.06) 
Climate suitability for 
agriculture 
3.13 
(1.16) 
3.29* 
(0.92) 
2.96* 
(1.40) 
Soil suitability for 
agriculture 
2.07 
(0.77) 
2.18** 
(0.68) 
1.91** 
(0.86) 
Land slope 3.29 
(0.74) 
3.28 
(0.73) 
3.33 
(0.73) 
Number habitats w/in 
200 miles (N=172) 
3.93 
(1.35) 
3.87 
(1.32) 
3.95 
(1.36) 
Ocean w/in 200 miles? 
(N=172) 
0.59 
(0.49) 
0.58 
(0.50) 
0.61 
(0.49) 
Frost months per year 
(N=182) 
1.31 
(3.21) 
0.77** 
(2.47) 
1.89** 
(3.79) 
Primary production 
(g/m2/year) 
1369.80 
(939.97) 
1390.83 
(891.84) 
1354.44 
(1008.54) 
Distance from Fertile 
Crescent (miles) 
4996.70 
(2456.02) 
4137.96*** 
(2495.33) 
6036.95*** 
(1961.32) 
Vertical Distance from 
Fertile Crescent (miles) 
1859.50 
(1248.37) 
1623.39*** 
(1160.26) 
2144.03*** 
(1298.53) 
Closer to another 
hearth? 
0.66 
(0.47) 
0.5*** 
(0.50) 
0.85*** 
(0.36) 
Distance to closest 
hearth (miles) 
2395.27 
(1256.75) 
2237.04* 
(1312.33) 
2594.23* 
(1170.73) 
Vertical distance to 
closest hearth (miles) 
1647.46 
(1077.28) 
1452.05*** 
(1109.03) 
1884.60*** 
(1001.32) 
Date of contact  1853.38 
(358.34) 
1810.19** 
(478.66) 
1905.29** 
(49.50) 
**    Difference in means significant at 5% 
*** Difference in means significant at 1% (assuming unequal variances)  
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TABLE 3: AVERAGE POPULATION DENSITY AND TECHNOLOGY BY THE DEGREE OF HIERARCHY. 
Technology variables Degree of 
Hierarchy 
Obs. Population 
Density Writing 
scale 
Agriculture 
scale 
Specialization 
scale 
Storage 
scale 
Technology 
scale 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
82 
48 
23 
19 
12 
2.03 
2.94 
3.74 
3.89 
4.50 
1.65 
2.06 
2.73 
4.21 
4.41 
2.77 
3.43 
4.13 
4.47 
5 
2.37 
2.96 
3.69 
4.47 
5 
1.67 
1.87 
1.70 
2.10 
2.25 
-0.85 
-0.14 
0.61 
1.72 
2.26 
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TABLE 4: SOME SIMPLE EMPIRICAL MODELS OF HIERARCHY AND TECHNOLOGY 
 
Dependent 
variable 
 
 
Degree of 
Hierarchy 
Degree of 
Hierarchy 
Degree of 
Hierarchy 
Hierarchy 
Dummy 
Hierarchy 
Dummy 
Hierarchy 
Dummy 
Method OLS IV IV Probit Probit, IV Probit, IV 
Population 
Density 
 
 
0.165*** 
(0.054) 
0.116 
(0.134) 
0.100 
(0.125) 
0.273*** 
(0.090) 
0.214 
(0.310) 
0.226 
(0.246) 
Technology 
Index 
 
 
- - 0.656*** 
(0.134) 
- - 0.737*** 
(0.282) 
Contribution of 
Agriculture 
 
0.043 
(0.057) 
0.179 
(0.120) 
- 0.032 
(0.094) 
0.121 
(0.287) 
- 
Specialization 
 
 
0.240*** 
(0.057) 
0.331** 
(0.145) 
- 0.235** 
(0.095) 
0.599 
(0.322) 
- 
Storage and 
Surplus 
 
 
0.137 
(0.090) 
0.204 
(0.259) 
- 0.118 
(0.153) 
0.931* 
(0.667) 
- 
Writing and 
Record-
Keeping 
 
0.339*** 
(0.049) 
0.233*** 
(0.087) 
- 0.331*** 
(0.097) 
0.192 
(0.239) 
- 
Constant -0.314 
(0.215) 
-0.808 
(0.538) 
1.799 
(0.345) 
-2.337*** 
(0.422) 
-4.819*** 
(1.654) 
 
R2 
  
0.560 0.549 0.533 - - - 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.548 0.535 0.528 - - - 
Obs. 184 167 167 184 167 167 
Notes: * significant at 10%, **=significant at 5%, ***= significant at 1%. In the case in which an instrumental variables regression is reported, the 
instruments used are the environmental and geographical variables (described in table 1). Probit IV estimates are obtained using a two-step estimator 
– one instrument had to be dropped for this (closeness to an ocean).  
  
